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T\\V UTAH SUPREME COURT 
SHELLY HIPWELL, an individual ) 
by and through her guardians, ) 
SHERRIE JENSEN and SHAYNE ) 
HIPWELL, ) 
) 
i11 a j . J i t . i f t •-/ K ^ M p ( i r n l f > n l '-,
 t i l u p r r m e C o u r t No. 9 2 0 2 1 8 
v s . , it I r i ui i L", II I I. 
) 
ROGER SHARP, TIM W, MEALY, ) 
and DOES 1 THROUGH x, ) 
) 
D e f e n d a n t s / A p p e l l a n t : : ; , ) 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES 
U t a h C o n s t . :r 
U t a h Code Ann , S§ ••"* , \> 
INTRODUCTION 
To a v o i d summary judgme* * - r o v e 
b e y o n -- r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t t h it - t\c / e r s i o r • ^ * *. o v e r n -
; • * .- c o n s t i t»- - ' n n a J A i n t i : !' ' s 
o p p o s i n g b n e t t d i i t iiw»e ,» . j r . q a ' *- u-
t o s a t i s f y h e r b u r d e n ol p r o o f on i h i s p o i n t . As shown b e l o w , 
e v e r y ,irquim-Mil a s s e r t i -i< , , I t i n t i f f i r. f a t a l l y f l a w e d . 
RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S "STATEMENT Ui? rtiK CASK" " _ 
"
 , f i
 *
 r
 •• l e f e n d a n t S h a r p r e l i e d u p o n two d i f f e r e n t 
amendme m o t i o n f o r summary j u d g -
m e n t imenujMurr inu :
 A *- -*i amendment , , 
c? 1987 amendment (§ 63-30-2(4)) and the 1991 amendment (§ 63-30-
3 ( 2 ) ( a ) ) both included the a c t i v i t i e s of t he University Hospital within the 
d e f i n i t i o n of "governmental f unc t i on . " Because Shel ly Hipwell 's in ju ry occurred 
in 1988, t h i s case i s control led by the 1987 amendment. Defendant has not raised 
the i s sue of the 1991 amendment on t h i s appeal to avoid r e t r o a c t i v i t y arguments. 
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summary judgment plaintiff had to prove that both of these amend-
ments were unconstitutional. However, plaintiff's opposing 
memorandum focused exclusively on the 1991 amendment. Plaintiff's 
only reference to the 1987 amendment was contained in a single-
sentence footnote that concluded without support that the 1987 
amendment is "clearly invalid." (R. 646). Plaintiff has recently 
attempted to dismiss her complete failure to discuss the 1987 
amendment by alleging that the principal argument raised by Sharp 
was the 1991 amendment and that the 1987 amendment was raised by 
Sharp only "in passing." (Appellee's Brief, p. 5). This is 
absolutely untrue, as reflected by the record. 
In his supporting brief defendant Sharp fully set forth the 
text of both the 1987 and 1991 amendments. Significantly, the text 
of the 1987 amendment was set forth first. (R. 552). Throughout 
the entire remaining portion of his memorandum Sharp always 
referred to the 1987 and 1991 amendments in tandem. Additionally, 
in every reference to the two amendments, the 1987 amendment was 
always identified first. (See R. 555, 561, 565, 567, 577). 
Plaintiff has no basis for alleging that the 1987 amendment was 
raised "in passing." Plaintiff failed to address the 1987 amend-
ment and therefore failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the amendment is unconstitutional. The trial court obviously erred 
At the trial level plaintiff used the greater portion of her opposing memorandum 
to argue that the 1991 amendment cannot be applied retroactively. Defendant 
responded by citing Frank v. State, 613 P.2d 517 (Utah 1980), which applied the 
1978 amendment retroactively to conclude that the University Hospital performed 
"governmental functions." Plaintiff admitted the facts necessary to invoke the 
1991 amendment. (R.166, 334-35). 
2 
in finding the IMH i nil ional "for the reasons 
specified i n p La i nt i f f ' =: memoranda. " ' U , " 2 b ) . 
RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S "ARGUMENT" 
As shown below, plaint ill""1, | 1 i «.»* " i • h " ,( M present a single 
argument sufficient L void summary judgment. For -hp con1 
11 I hi "* -^fendan* ii - espond each plaintiff 
arguments 
correspond * * no neaci, nqs usen * Plaintiff /appeilee s in . e-i 
A« THE DAMAGE LIMXTATlun U U L D nwx VIOLATE "THE OPEN-COURTS" 
PROVISION OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION, 
i' mil H I , 11 1111.1 i" i 11 il i !. i if, i A ' s l i a b i l i t y limit of c;« 2 5 0 , 0 0 0 
violar.es ~i. > " o p e n - c o u r t s " p r o v i s i o n ol Hi"1 ntiib " '»»>• ' '' • 
because • "T'lio governmental/proprietary distinction applied 
state enr^-.ji. il iiiii n I i I i I In I'MIA -l^prives plaintiff •-
-emedy against state employees that existed at common 
•- - arguments must f a i I 
The Government a 1 / Pr opr i e tar y D :i s t :i n c I: ::i o n d :i d no t App 1 y to 
State Entities at Common Law. 
The many authorities , *. «.»< . ^ idi 
brief /now *~\r, the state was absolutely mmi. : . t_- . ^,i . . ^  n^ri 
1 - ' --^-ir*. "Fh i-rhorit:es further 
demonstrate ,,.*: municipalities -^ i IIIITI „a± 
functions + proprietary functic - . govern-
meiit.d ^ t n r w ! n ^ * municipality's 
immunity K\A.\ *C tppiio.it, -.. ,iai 
Plaint * f responds rv. -liming * ia? e ne authorities are split 
over * - ^ -; - * r y a pp I i ed f: o 
state entities at jommcr m . ,uppo; * , . .ant.: : •- r i IK| -< it.es 
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a number of cases. Not one of the cited cases supports plaintiff's 
position. The case relied upon most heavily by plaintiff is 
Hershel v. University Hosp. Found., 610 P.2d 237 (Okla. 1980). 
Hershel held that the State of Oklahoma was capable of performing 
"proprietary functions" under Oklahoma's governmental immunity act. 
Hershel did not hold that a state entity performed "proprietary 
functions" at common law. Indeed, the Oklahoma Supreme Court has 
subsequently acknowledged that Hershel represents a departure from 
the common law and has refused to apply Hershel retroactively. See 
Burns v. Rader. 723 P.2d 266, 267-68 (Okla. 1986); Fox v. Oklahoma 
Memorial Hosp., 774 P.2d 459, 461 (Okla. 1989). 
Plaintiff also cites Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. 
Wainscott. 19 P.2d 328 (Ariz. 1933). However, Hartford did not 
hold that states were capable of performing "proprietary functions" 
at common law. Hartford did not even involve a suit against a 
government entity. Rather, Hartford acknowledged the differing 
treatment given to states and municipalities at common law. Id. at 
330. 
The remaining cases cited by plaintiff not only fail to 
support her position, but also provide direct support to defendant. 
See Henry v. Oklahoma Turnpike Auth., 478 P.2d 898, 901 (Okla. 
1970) ("This state has long been committed to the rule, without a 
single exception, that the State is immune from suits without its 
waiver or consent", citing 18 cases); Union Trust Co. v. State, 99 
P. 183, 188 (Cal. 1908) (even though a state might be liable for 
breach of contract, the state cannot be sued without its consent); 
McCoy v. Kenosha County, 218 N.W. 348 (Wis. 1928) (statutory 
4 
i. courts11 provision; 
courts shoulc , :(-u: egislaturc- ^vcrnmental immunity 
issues -akKer: v. ;t;i~ * - . • . , . i 928) (state only 
liable because i ,r *• n be 
brought against the state11 claims arising out state's 
ir *- -r*a;r-'- mk of ignited States v. The 
Planter's Bank of Georgia, 3 
ownership of stock in a private corporation does prevent 
coifwii.ii ion I i III beinq : \\\ni; -invernment itse'f <\-*n^ct i^ sued); 
Green vs. Commonwealth, 435 N.E.2d 362 (Mass. App. 1982) (Go1 e r i i-
mental/Propriety distincti on di d not app] y to state at common 1 aw). 
I ' ] a i i i t: i f f t :i : :i e s t: <::> e::: :p ] a :i i i 1: i c= i: :i i i a ] : • :ii ] iii t ^  t: c: c :ii t e p r ecedent by 
stating that no precedent exists because state entities historic-
ally did no t perform any act: that cou] d be considered "proprietary" 
under government a J /pr \ ipr i e tar y ai ia] gument 
plaintiff contradicts her own prior a v .- * , r »i(il ;ie operation of 
i 'it ah-4 ho'»|iif",il i,; "proprietary * ** • f r~ah operated a 
hospital as early as 188H, See Addendum 
In desperation plaintiff has attempted to shift the burden of 
ninnl I <IPI i'mMnl r, i1 iinpf1 1 1 ants: " -*? ants have not ..HIinin;l cannot 
point to niiy state activity .it common I. . . . I;:!i il 
remotely ; ;r >priet ar : nature." (Appei4ee' s Brief 
"I prrwiivi t idi trie UGIA deprives her 
or a commcr nw remedy against the stu • "«"*+* ^icp-versa. In my 
event :-• ^ *** r nmrrr«-,t \ comparison * <arly Utah cases 
revec *J , i I , ' - mm in i i i p.i I i 
performed the same types or. activities, T • the state was immune. 
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One example is the differing treatment given to states and 
municipalities for water supply activities. Whenever a munici-
pality was sued at common law for injuries or property damage 
arising from the negligent construction or maintenance of canals 
and water courses, the Utah courts consistently held that such 
activities were "proprietary functions" to which governmental 
immunity did not extend. See e.g. Levy v. Salt Lake City, 3 Utah 
63, 1 P. 160 (1881); Lew v. Salt Lake City, 5 Utah 302, 16 P. 598 
(1888); Kiesel & Co. v. Ogden City, 8 Utah 237, 30 P. 758 (1892); 
Brown v. Salt Lake City, 33 Utah 222, 93 P. 570 (1908); Davis v. 
Midvale City, 56 Utah 1, 189 P. 74 (1920); Eaelhoff v. Oaden City, 
71 Utah 511, 267 P. 1011 (1928). However, when the state was sued 
for the same activity the suit was dismissed, as shown in Wilkinson 
v. State, 42 Utah 483, 134 P. 626 (1913). 
The plaintiff in Wilkinson attempted to sue the state for 
defects in an irrigation reservoir and canal that broke and damaged 
the plaintiff's property. However, unlike the municipal cases the 
plaintiff's complaint in Wilkinson was summarily dismissed. The 
Utah Supreme Court explained that sovereign immunity prevented the 
very act of filing a complaint against the state without consent: 
In the absence of either express constitutional or 
statutory authority an action against a sovereign state 
cannot be maintained. The doctrine is elementary and of 
universal application, and so far as we are aware there 
is not a single authority to the contrary. 
Id. at 630, 42 Utah at 492-93. 
The Court explained that sovereign immunity "shielded the 
state from being sued in the courts" and that without consent the 
6 
courts lacked jurisdiction to even entertain a suit against the 
state. Id. at 631, 42 Utah at 495. 
The great weight of precedent demonstrates that common-law 
courts extended immunity to state entities without considering the 
entity7s activities. This contrasted with the application of 
sovereign immunity to municipalities, where the courts looked past 
the entity and considered the activity. 
B. PLAINTIFF HAS NOT PROPERLY ALLEGED OR PROVEN THAT THE UGIA 
DEPRIVES HER OF A REMEDY AGAINST STATE EMPLOYEES. 
Plaintiff argues that the UGIA is unconstitutional because it 
deprives her of a common law remedy against state employees without 
providing an adequate substitute remedy. With respect to this 
argument it is important to understand the lower court proceedings. 
Defendant's initial memorandum in support of summary judgment 
argued that plaintiff's settlement was reasonable as a matter of 
law because plaintiff was injured by an employee of the College of 
Medicine and that, even after Condemarin, the liability of the 
College of Medicine was limited to $250,000 under the UGIA. 
Plaintiff's opposing memorandum did not contest defendant's 
arguments, but rather argued that the University Hospital was also 
liable and that the liability limit was unconstitutional with 
regards to the University Hospital. Defendant's reply memorandum 
argued that, even if the University Hospital were liable, plain-
tiff's recovery would still be limited to $250,000 because of 
subsequent amendments that reinstated the liability limit to the 
University Hospital. Plaintiff submitted a supplemental memorandum 
contesting the constitutionality of the amendments. During the 
7 
lower court proceedings plaintiff never asserted, even in passing, 
that the UGIA unconstitutionally deprived her of a remedy against 
state employees• Plaintiff did not even cite that portion of the 
UGIA extending immunity to state employees. Rather, the immunity 
of state employees was never an issue at the trial level. 
On appeal plaintiff now seeks to raise the employee-immunity 
issue for the first time. This is completely inappropriate. This 
Court has repeatedly emphasized that defenses, claims, and issues 
not raised at the trial level cannot be considered for the first 
time on appeal. See Banaerter v. Poulton, 663 P.2d 100, 102 (Utah 
1983); Pratt v. City Council, 639 P.2d 172, 173 (Utah 1981). "This 
general rule applies equally to constitutional issues,11 Pratt, 639 
P.2d at 173-74, and also to appeals from lower court rulings on 
summary judgment motions. See e.g., Schaer v. State, 657 P.2d 
1337, 1341-42 (Utah 1983); Villeneuve v. Schamanek, 639 P.2d 214, 
215 (Utah 1981); Clegg v. Lee, 30 Utah 2d 242, 516 P.2d 348 (1973). 
Plaintiff "did not . . . raise [her employee-immunity issues] 
before the trial court and has therefore waived any right to 
present them on appeal." Crookston v Fire Ins. Exch. , 817 P.2d 
789, 800-01 (Utah 1991). 
Additionally, plaintiff has devoted only \ \ pages of her brief 
to the new issue of employee immunity. Within this limited space 
plaintiff simply assumes, without support, that the law favors her 
position. As the brief of the Attorney General demonstrates, the 
new issue raised by plaintiff is difficult and complex and cannot 
be decided in conclusory fashion. 
8 
In order to succeed on her new issue plaintiff must prove two 
essential points. First, plaintiff must prove that she had a 
remedy against state physicians at common law. Plaintiff's brief 
does not address this issue in the slightest, but simply concludes 
that the element is satisfied. Appellee's brief, p. 24. 
Plaintiff's self-serving conclusion is far from sufficient to prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the UGIA is unconstitutional. The 
Attorney General's brief demonstrates that state employees had a 
broad grant of immunity at common law. Employee immunity was 
determined by applying a discretionary/ministerial function 
analysis. This analysis has not even been mentioned by plaintiff. 
In order to apply the discretionary/ministerial function analysis 
to the instant case it would be necessary to research and brief the 
issue to the same extent that the parties have researched and 
briefed the governmental/proprietary function distinction. The 
parties cannot possibly perform the necessary research and briefing 
at this stage in the appellate proceeding. 
In addition to showing the existence of a common law remedy, 
plaintiff must also prove that the UGIA deprived her of the remedy 
without providing a comparable substitute. Plaintiff's brief 
similarly fails to address this element and again simply concludes 
that the element is satisfied. Appellee's Brief, p. 25. Plaintiff 
cannot satisfy her burden of proof on such assumptions. The issue 
of whether a substitute remedy is adequate requires extensive 
research and briefing, as demonstrated in the brief of the Attorney 
General. The reasonableness of a substitute remedy cannot be based 
upon monetary value alone, but must also consider the fact that the 
9 
new remedy s u b s t i t u t e s a s o l v e n t d e f e n d a n t f o r a p o t e n t i a l l y b a n k -
r u p t d e f e n d a n t and e l i m i n a t e s t h e h a s s l e s and e x p e n s e s a s s o c i a t e d 
w i t h m u l t i p l e - d e f e n d a n t l a w s u i t s . P l a i n t i f f h a s n o t d e m o n s t r a t e d 
t h a t h e r a l l e g e d remedy a g a i n s t t h e r e s i d e n t i n t e r n was s u b s t a n -
t i a l l y g r e a t e r t h a n h e r remedy a g a i n s t t h e s t a t e . 2 
P l a i n t i f f ' s new i s s u e i s beyond t h e s c o p e of t h i s a p p e a l , a s 
e v i d e n c e d by t h e p a r t i e s ' i s s u e s t a t e m e n t s and t h e r e c o r d b e l o w . 
The i s s u e c a n n o t be d i s c u s s e d w i t h o u t e x t e n s i v e r e s e a r c h and 
b r i e f i n g . I f t h e C o u r t r u l e s on t h i s new i s s u e b a s e d o n l y upon 
p l a i n t i f f ' s u n s u p p o r t e d c o n c l u s i o n s , t h e C o u r t c o u l d be l e d i n t o 
t h e same t y p e of e r r o r c a u s e d by i n a d e q u a t e b r i e f i n g i n Condemar in . 
The m e r i t s of p l a i n t i f f ' s new i s s u e a r e q u e s t i o n a b l e a t b e s t 
i n l i g h t of t h e f a c t t h a t none of t h e numerous c a s e s c i t e d by 
d e f e n d a n t s h a v e acknowledged t h e i s s u e . However, i f t h i s C o u r t i s 
i n c l i n e d t o a c c e p t p l a i n t i f f ' s new a r g u m e n t i t s h o u l d do s o i n 
a n o t h e r c a s e where t h e e m p l o y e e - i m m u n i t y i s s u e h a s been f u l l y 
r e s e a r c h e d and b r i e f e d . P l a i n t i f f h a s wa ived h e r r i g h t t o r a i s e 
t h e i s s u e i n t h i s c a s e . 
C. THE DAMAGE LIMITATION DOES NOT VIOLATE DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL 
PROTECTION, 
P l a i n t i f f devotes the remaining por t ion of her b r ie f to 
arguing t h a t the UGIA's l i a b i l i t y l imi t of $250,000 v i o l a t e s due 
Notwithstanding the fact that p l a i n t i f f Shel ly Hipwell has passed away, 
her family w i l l continue to rece ive $1,315 a month u n t i l July 1, 2009; $15,000 
a year for four years beginning on July 1, 2003; and $21,500 a year for four 
years beginning on July 1, 2007. (R. 216) . The burden of proof i s on p l a i n t i f f 
t o show that she could have recovered more than t h i s from the res ident intern 
that performed her operation, who was capable of f i l i n g for bankruptcy. 
P l a i n t i f f has not s a t i s f i e d her burden of proof on t h i s po int . 
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process and equal protection. None of the various arguments raised 
by plaintiff are valid, as shown below. 
1. The Rational Basis Standard Should be Used to Scrutinize 
the UGIA. 
Plaintiff argues that the UGIA should be scrutinized under the 
"strict scrutiny" standard of review even if the "open courts" 
clause has not been violated. Plaintiff claims that strict 
scrutiny is appropriate because "the damage limitation [in the 
UGIA] severely restricted the important substantive right of an 
individual to recover for personal injuries." Appellee's brief, p. 
27. Plaintiff further claims that the right to recover for 
personal injuries is a property right separately protected by the 
due process clause, without any reliance upon the "open courts" 
clause. This represents a pure substantive due process argument. 
As Justice Stewart pointed out in Condemarin v. University 
Hosp., 775 P.2d 348 (Utah 1989), substantive due process analysis 
is largely a thing of the past and constitutes an illegitimate 
exercise of judicial power: 
The era of federal substantive due process analysis ended 
shortly after Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 54 S.Ct. 
505, 78 L.Ed. 940 (1934). That era stands as the high 
water mark of an ill-fated and, I believe, illegitimate 
exercise of judicial power in the realm of legislative 
power. I strongly oppose any effort to put this Court on 
that track for a variety of reasons, including my view of 
separation of powers. Although substantive due process 
has not been wholly abandoned in some states, including 
Utah, it has by and large only been employed in cases of 
extreme arbitrariness, and this is not such a case. 
Id. at 369 (Justice Stewart). 
Plaintiff cannot prevail on her substantive due process claim. 
In Condemarin three justices rejected the notion that the due 
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process clause contains a substantive right to a remedy for 
personal injuries. See Id. at 369, 378 (J.J. Stewart, Hall, & 
Howe). Even the remaining justices, who favored substantive due 
process analysis, found that a violation of the "open courts" 
provision was necessary to invoke the doctrine. See Id. at 357, 
3 66-68 (J.J. Durham & Zimmerman). 
As shown repeatedly throughout defendants' briefs, the UGIA 
does not violate the "open courts" provision of the Utah 
Constitution. Consequently the UGIA will be scrutinized under the 
"rational basis" standard of review rather than the "strict 
scrutiny" standard advanced by plaintiff. When the "open courts" 
provision is not violated directly plaintiff cannot use the 
provision indirectly to obtain a heightened level of scrutiny under 
due process and equal protection analysis. See Estate of Carcrill 
v. City of Rochester, 406 A.2d 704, 707 (N.H. 1979) (discussed on 
pp. 37-38 of Sharp's original brief). 
Significantly, plaintiff has been unable to cite a single case 
where a governmental immunity act was invalidated under substantive 
due process analysis. In contrast, defendants have cited numerous 
cases upholding governmental immunity acts and their liability 
limits under all types of constitutional attacks. The overwhelming 
majority of case precedent is clearly in defendants' favor. 
Plaintiff's substantive due process argument lacks sufficient legal 
grounds to avoid awarding summary judgment to defendants. 
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2. The Damage Limitation in the U6IA is Constitutional Under 
a Rational Basis Standard of Review. 
When determining whether a statute violates the equal 
protection or due process clauses the courts apply one of three 
levels of scrutiny to the statute. As pointed out throughout 
Condemarin, the level of scrutiny applied depends on the type of 
constitutional right infringed upon. Generally speaking, statutes 
that infringe upon fundamental rights (under due process analysis) 
or discriminate based upon the suspect classes of race and alienage 
(under equal protection analysis) are subject to "strict scrutiny." 
In strict scrutiny cases the statute will only be upheld when the 
statute is necessary to accomplish a compelling government 
objective, and even then the statute must utilize the least 
restrictive alternative available. Statutes that infringe upon 
important constitutional rights (under due process analysis) or 
that discriminate based upon sex, illegitimacy, or alienage (under 
equal protection analysis) are subject to mid-tier scrutiny. In 
those cases a statute will be upheld when the statute is substan-
tially related to an important government objective. All other 
statutes receive mere "rational basis" scrutiny, where the statute 
need only be rationally related to a legitimate government 
objective. See generally Condemarin. 775 P.2d at 354-360 (J. 
Durham) ; Id. at 368 (J. Zimmerman) ; Id. at 373 (J. Stewart) ; Id. at 
380-81 (J.J. Hall & Howe). Under rational basis scrutiny the Court 
is very deferential to the legislature. See Id. at 354, 359. 
The rational basis standard is, beyond doubt, the appropriate 
standard of scrutiny to use in this case. All of the justices in 
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Condemarin agreed that the liability limit in the UGIA did not 
interfere with a fundamental right so as to be subject to strict 
scrutiny. See Id. at 354, 266, 373, 378. While three justices in 
Condemarin did apply mid-tier scrutiny, they all did so upon the 
belief that the UGIA conflicted with the "open courts" provision 
of the Utah Constitution. The justices seemed to recognize that, 
absent a conflict with "open courts," the UGIA would be subject to 
mere rational basis scrutiny. See e.g. Id. at 354, 373. 
In this case the 1987 UGIA does not conflict with the "open 
courts" provision. Consequently the 1987 UGIA should be scruti-
nized under the rational basis standard of review. 
Plaintiff argues that the UGIA would be unconstitutional even 
under the rational basis standard of review because a "less drastic 
alternative was available" and because the liability limit was not 
"urgently and overwhelmingly necessary" for the protection of the 
public treasury. This argument is invalid on its face. Only the 
strict scrutiny standard of review considers whether there is a 
"less drastic alternative" and whether a statute is "necessary." 
Such considerations do not apply under rational basis scrutiny, 
where a statute is only required to be rationally related to a 
legitimate government objective. Plaintiff has confused the 
differing standards of review. 
Plaintiff also argues that "appellants made no showing in the 
court below that the damage limitation was necessary to preserve 
the public treasury." Appellees' brief, p. 31 (emphasis added). 
Besides the fact that a showing of "necessity" is not required 
under the rational basis standard, plaintiff's argument must also 
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fail for the reason that the burden of proof is upon plaintiff, and 
not defendants, to show that the UGIA is unconstitutional. Again 
plaintiff is attempting to improperly shift her burden of proof to 
defendants. 
Plaintiff argues that "issues of fact exist" that prevent this 
Court from determining whether the rational basis test is satis-
fied. Plaintiff fails to realize that the rational basis test is 
a legal standard of review to be decided by the Court. 
The UGIA is certainly constitutional under the rational basis 
standard of review. It cannot be realistically questioned that the 
state has a legitimate interest in protecting public funds. Nor 
can it be realistically questioned that the UGIA does in fact 
protect public monies. Consequently, the UGIA is rationally 
related to a legitimate government objective so as to satisfy the 
rational basis test. 
Protection of the public treasury is not the only government 
objective furthered by the UGIA. The UGIA allows the state to 
provide high-risk medical care that is unavailable at private 
institutions because of the fear of malpractice claims. The UGIA's 
liability limit also helps the state attract quality physicians and 
specialists into Utah to work at the University Medical Center. In 
addition, the liability limit makes it possible for the state to 
operate a medical school for the benefit of its citizens, thus 
fulfilling its constitutional mandate of providing institutes of 
higher learning. See Utah Const, art. X, §§ 1, 4. 
Nearly every court considering the constitutionality of a 
statutory limit on a state's liability has applied the rational 
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basis test and has concluded that the test is satisfied. 
Condemarin is one of the rare exceptions. There, the plurality 
applied mid-tier scrutiny because they were led to believe that the 
UGIA conflicted with the "open courts" provision of the state 
constitution. In virtually every other case the statutory 
liability limit has been upheld, as demonstrated by the many 
authorities already cited in defendants' briefs. Numerous other 
examples can be found by referring to the annotation in 43 A.L.R. 
4th 19 (1986) , where the cases are so one-sided that they are 
summarized as follows: 
Courts have almost uniformly recognized that legislative 
bodies have the power to prescribe [liability] limits, 
and that the limits prescribed are constitutionally 
valid. Though they may abridge the remedies of victims 
of government, as opposed to private torts, damage 
limitation statutes or ordinances are almost unanimously 
viewed as having a rational basis in the government's 
need to provide for effective risk management. . . . In 
addition to repelling equal protection attacks on damage 
limitation laws, the courts have also consistently 
rejected arguments that such enactments violate due 
process, or that they abridge state constitutional 
guarantees of access to courts for redress of grievances, 
or impair vested rights. 
Annot., 43 A.L.R. 4th 19, 25 (1986) (emphasis added). 
The overwhelming precedents cited by defendants stand in 
shocking contrast to the sparse authority offered by plaintiff. In 
all of her briefing, both at the trial level and on appeal, plain-
tiff has only cited two cases holding that a statute limiting the 
liability of the state is unconstitutional. One of these cases is 
Condemarin which, as already discussed, was based upon an assump-
tion that the UGIA violated the "open courts" clause. The other 
case is Pfost v. State, 713 P.2d 495 (Mont. 1985). Pfost is 
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inapplicable to this case because it was decided after the State of 
Montana passed a constitutional amendment that "swept aside all 
notions of governmental immunity, and provided . . . ' [that] the 
state, counties, cities, towns, and all other local governmental 
entities shall have no immunity from suit for injury to a person or 
property.'" Id. at 499, quoting Montana Const, art II, § 18. 
Prior to the amendment "the State and its agents enjoyed total 
immunity from suit or tort action[s]. . . . " Id. Pfost is thus 
blatantly distinguishable from the case at hand. 
Plaintiff has also cited to Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125 
(N.D. 1978). Arneson has absolutely no application to this case 
because it did not involve a government entity and did not involve 
a governmental immunity statute. Instead, Arneson involved a 
private entity under a medical malpractice statute. This also 
holds true for each of the six cases that plaintiff string-cited in 
footnote 2 of her brief. As defendant's original brief has 
adequately demonstrated, and as plaintiff has failed to rebut, the 
overwhelming majority of courts have upheld statutes limiting the 
liability of state entities under a governmental immunity act. 
In light of the foregoing it is apparent that the trial court 
erred in concluding that the amended UGIA is unconstitutional. The 
trial court's decision should be reversed and summary judgment 
should be entered in defendants' favor. 
3. The 1987 Amendment Cured any Constitutional Defect that 
Existed in the UGIA Prior to the Amendment. 
Plaintiff's final argument alleges that the 1987 amendment did 
not remedy the constitutional defects held to exist in the UGIA by 
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Condemarin. In support plaintiff advances two arguments, neither 
of which survive scrutiny• 
(a) The 1987 amendment was not intended to eliminate 
the varying classifications created by the UGIA. 
Plaintiff argues that the amended UGIA is unconstitutional 
because the 1987 amendment does not eliminate the differing treat-
ment given to victims of government tort feasors and victims of 
private tort feasors. Plaintiff does not understand the purpose 
and effect of the 1987 amendment. 
Plaintiff incorrectly assumes that the UGIA must eliminate all 
classifications and differing treatment in order to be constitu-
tional. If this were so a large number of the state's current 
statutes would be unconstitutional, including its welfare statutes. 
The fact that a statute treats individuals differently does not 
mean that the statute is unconstitutional, but simply means that 
the statute will be subject to judicial scrutiny. The level of 
scrutiny applied depends upon the right that is infringed upon. 
The 1987 amendment is not intended to eliminate the UGIA's varying 
classifications, but is rather intended to decrease the level of 
judicial scrutiny by eliminating conflict with the "open courts" 
provision. This is accomplished by defining all state activities 
as "governmental functions." By eliminating conflict with the 
"open courts" provision the 1987 amendment reduces the level of 
scrutiny applied to the UGIA from "mid-tier" to "rational basis," 
which is the crucial issue, as recognized by Justice Durham. See 
Condemarin. 775 P. 2d at 359 ("The crucial issue in such cases 
remains which standard of review the Court chooses to apply"). 
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(b) The power to define "governmental function11 is 
vested in the legislature. 
As demonstrated, at common law state entities could not be 
sued without the state's consent. The UGIA provides the statutory 
scheme needed to sue the state. Under the legislature's plan the 
state first retains all of its immunities by extending immunity to 
"governmental functions," which are defined to include all state 
activities. The state then waives its immunity up to $250,000. 
Plaintiff challenges the legislature's power to define 
"governmental function" under its own statutory scheme. By so 
doing, plaintiff also challenges the state's right to determine 
which of its entities will be subject to suit. Plaintiff's argu-
ments constitute a challenge to the entire common law doctrine of 
sovereign immunity, which gives the state exclusive power to deter-
mine when it will be subject to suit. This Court has previously 
held that "sovereign immunity is not unconstitutional," and there-
fore plaintiff's arguments must fail as a matter of law. Madsen v. 
Borthick, 658 P.2d 627, 629 (Utah 1983). 
Plaintiff argues that the state will be able to abuse its 
immunities if it is allowed to define its own activities as 
"governmental functions." Significantly, plaintiff cannot point to 
any existing abuse of legislative power, but simply poses hypo-
thetical . If this Court is concerned that the legislature might 
abuse its power in the future, the Court should wait until such an 
abuse of power is manifest before striking down the UGIA. The 
legislature has controlled governmental immunity since the time of 
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statehood without any abuse of power. More than likely no abuse 
will ever be manifest. 
The UGIA itself is not an abuse of legislative power. Rather, 
the UGIA is the result of extensive research into the best way to 
balance an individual's need for a remedy with the state's need for 
solvency. Prior to its adoption the UGIA was subjected to exten-
sive study, research, debate and analysis, as evidenced by legisla-
tive history: 
The 1963 legislature directed the Council to study the 
effects upon states, their political subdivisions and 
municipal corporations of waiver of immunity from suit 
and consenting to be liable for the torts of its 
officers, employees, and agents. . . . The legislature 
considered this study of such importance that it 
separately appropriated the sum of $25,000 and directed 
the Council to appoint a committee. . . . 
* * * 
Research activities include field investigations, 
gathering of data, assimilation of information, formula-
tion of proposals, drafting of legislation, and the 
preparation of a final report. Investigations of the 
claims experience of the state and its political sub-
divisions has been included in the Committee study. The 
extent of insurance coverage by governmental entities, 
the cost of such insurance and claims experience have 
been part of the study. Questionnaires were sent to 
other states in regard to tort claims and consequential 
damage claims. The statutes of other states have been 
reviewed and catalogued. The Utah Code has been care-
fully examined, section by section. Case decisions have 
been studied. Conferences have been held with insurance 
personnel and rating information has been obtained from 
the National Bureau of Casualty Underwriters. Seven 
working drafts of legislation have been prepared and 
studied by the staff, by committee members, and by the 
executive committee. 
The committee considered the important questions of 
whether governmental immunity from suit was important in 
the state and whether legislation was needed. 
Addendum, pp. 16-17 (Report and Recommendations of the Utah 
Legislative Council, 1963-1965) (emphasis added). 
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Legislative history further shows that the state was aware of 
the need to provide its citizens with a remedy against the state• 
However, the legislature was also concerned that providing new 
remedies might be too burdensome: 
Numerous citizens have been injured in their person and 
property by negligent acts of government employees and by 
the construction of public improvements. In many of 
these cases no recourse against the governmental entity 
has been possible. It was found that the present [common 
law] system works substantial injustice to citizens. 
There is fear, however, among government officials, that 
to open the door to unrestrained claims would be too 
burdensome upon governmental funds. 
Addendum, p. 17. See also Addendum, pp. 9-14 (Legislature had real 
fear that unlimited waiver of immunity would overwhelm state). 
The UGIA represents a balance between the tort victim's need 
for a remedy and the state's need for solvency. This balance was 
struck by codifying the state's common law immunity and then 
waiving the immunity up to a limited amount. The courts are only 
given jurisdiction to determine the state's liability where 
immunity has been waived: 
This legislation reaffirms the rule of governmental 
immunity, thus eliminating any confusion in the law, and 
then carves out specific exceptions where, as a matter of 
justice, immunity from suit should be waived. No effort 
is made in the bill to create new or unique rules of 
substantive liability as far as governmental agencies are 
concerned. Where immunity is waived, liability or 
responsibility would then be determined by the courts. 
Addendum, p. 19 (emphasis added). 
The legislature concluded that the UGIA's "part-way [waiver of 
immunity] does protect the citizens of our state." Addendum, p. A-
21 
As shown above, the UGIA was intended to benefit the citizens 
of Utah by providing them with a remedy against the state where 
none previously existed. The UGIA is not an abuse of legislative 
power. The legislature acted in good faith when it adopted the 
UGIA and the legislation should be upheld. 
Plaintiff also argues that "the legislature cannot by fiat 
make everything a governmental function. . . . " Appellee's brief, 
p. 36. However, plaintiff cites only two cases, neither of which 
support her argument. Rather, both cases support defendant's claim 
that the legislature can define "governmental function." 
The first case plaintiff cites is Standiford v. Salt Lake City 
Corp.. 605 P. 2d 1230 (Utah 1980) . In Standiford this Court derived 
a test to be used for determining whether a government entity is 
performing a "governmental function" under the UGIA. At the time 
the test was created the term "governmental function" was not 
defined by the UGIA. The 1987 amendment remedied this defect by 
defining "governmental function." Plaintiff argues that the 
Standiford definition of "governmental function" should prevail 
over the legislature's definition. This is incorrect. In 
Standiford this Court made it clear that it was defining "govern-
mental function" only because the UGIA "gives this Court the power 
to define understandably and logically the term "governmental 
function." Id. at 1235. The Court then defined "governmental 
function" in the manner that it believed to be "consistent with the 
plain legislative intent in [the UGIA]." Id. at 1237. 
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Additionally, Standiford recognized that the legislature could 
define "governmental function" to include government-owned hospi-
tals and thereby overrule prior case precedent to the contrary: 
Subsequent to the decision in Greenhalqh v. Pavson City, 
supra, § 63-30-3 was amended to specifically exempt 
governmentally-owned hospitals. . . . To the extent that 
Payson City is now covered by § 63-30-3, the holding in 
Greenhalqh has been legislatively overruled. 
Id. at 1232 n.l. 
Standiford thus shows that the Court will yield to the 
legislature when it comes to defining "governmental function." 
The second case cited by plaintiff is Hansen v. Salt Lake 
County, 794 P.2d 838 (Utah 1990). Hansen involved a 1984 amendment 
to the UGIA that included flood control activities within the 
definition of "governmental function." This Court allowed the 
legislature to amend the definition of "governmental function" to 
include flood control activities and upheld the UGIA, stating that: 
We are persuaded that the weight of logic, legislative 
history, and constitutional imperatives supports the 
conclusion that the amendment does no more than define 
flood control activities to be governmental functions. 
Id. at 845-46. 
Additionally, although the 1987 amendment was not at issue, 
this Court seemed to recognize that the amendment is authoritative: 
The term "governmental function" was not defined by the 
Act until 1987. . . . Until 1987, the scope of the term 
was defined by our case law, as it had been before the 
Act was passed. 
Id. at 842-43 (citations omitted; emphasis added). 
Standiford and Hansen, along with approximately 24 other cases 
cited in Sharp's original brief, all suggest that the legislature 
can define "governmental function." Plaintiff has completely 
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failed to cite any authority to the contrary. Plaintiff's lack of 
authority demonstrates the weakness of her argument and makes it 
impossible for her to overcome the presumption of validity attached 
to the 1987 amendment. The overwhelming majority of cases hold 
that the legislature can control the entire field of governmental 
immunity, including the definition of "governmental function." 
In this regard, it is important that this case be decided on 
the legal merits and not on personal opinions regarding the value 
of governmental immunity. The control of governmental immunity is 
undisputedly vested in the legislature alone. The legislature is 
uniquely capable of performing the extensive studies necessary to 
properly balance the competing interests involved in governmental 
immunity issues. Prior to adopting the UGIA the Utah Legislature 
engaged in such studies and determined that the UGIA strikes the 
proper balance. The citizens of Utah have placed their trust in 
their legislators to make this determination. The UGIA should not 
be overturned simply because the Court thinks that the Act is 
unwise or unfair: 
This Court cannot ignore or strike down an act because it 
is either wise or unwise. The wisdom or lack of wisdom 
is for the legislature to determine. If the act is 
unjust, amendments to correct the inequities should be 
made by the legislature and not by judicial 
interpretation. Years of study and millions of dollars 
have been spent on research and study . . . , and the 
legislature is able to profit by these efforts when 
considering legislation on the subject. If after 
considering the reasons for and against a bill, the 
legislature enacts it into law, arguments for correction 
of any claimed inequities should be addressed to the 
legislature where they can be considered and if found to 
exist, be corrected. 
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Masich v. United States Smelting, Ref. & Mining Co., 113 Utah 101, 
126-27, 191 P.2d 612, 625 (1948). 
If this Court goes against the great weight of authority and 
overturns the UGIA and its liability limit, the Court will be 
stripping the control of governmental immunity from the legislature 
and vesting that control in the judiciary. Such an act would 
violate the separation of powers clause of Utah Const, art. V, § 1. 
See Cobia v. Roy City, 12 Utah 2d 375, 377-78, 366 P.2d 986, 988 
(1961). Such an act would also increase the confusion that already 
exists in the governmental immunity arena because of contradictory 
statutes and judicial opinions. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff has failed to cite a single case supporting her 
argument on any material issue. The overwhelming weight of 
authority shows that the liability limit contained in the 1987 UGIA 
is constitutional. The trial court erred in concluding otherwise. 
Defendant therefore urges this Court to reverse the trial court. 
DATED this day of December, 1992. 
STRONG7& HANNI 
"David TT. Niels'on ~ 
Attorneys for Defendant Roger T. Sharp 
104520bc 
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ADDENDUM 
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
ARTICLE I 
DECLARATION OF 
RIGHTS 
Sec. 7. [Due process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process 
of law. 
Sec. 11. [Courts open — Redress of injuries.] 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his 
person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, which 
shall be administered without denial or unnecessary delay; and no person 
shall be barred from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in this 
State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is a party. 
Sec. 24. [Uniform operation of laws.] 
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation. 
ARTICLE V 
DISTRIBUTION OF POWERS 
Section 1. [Three departments of government.] 
The powers of the government of the State of Utah shall be divided into 
three distinct departments, the Legislative, the Executive, and the Judicial; 
and no person charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of 
these departments, shall exercise any functions appertaining to either of the 
others, except in the cases herein expressly directed or permitted. 
n_n 
UTAH CODE 
ANNOTATED 
CHAPTER 30 
GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT 
63-30-2. Definitions-
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Claim" means any claim or cause of action for money or damages 
against a governmental entity or against an employee. 
(2) (a) "Employee" includes a governmental entity's officers, em-
ployees, servants, trustees, commissioners, members of a governing 
body, members of a board, members of a commission, or members of 
an advisory body, student teachers certificated in accordance with 
Section 53A-6-101, educational aides, students engaged in providing 
services to members of the public in the course of an approved medi-
cal, nursing, or other professional health care clinical training pro-
gram, volunteers, and tutors, but does not include an independent 
contractor. 
(b) "Employee" includes all of the positions identified in Subsec-
tion (2)(a), whether or not the individual holding that position re-
ceives compensation. 
(3) "Governmental entity" means the state and its political subdivi-
sions as defined in this chapter. 
(4) (a) "Governmental function" means any act, failure to act, opera-
tion, function, or undertaking of a governmental entity whether or 
not the act, failure to act, operation, function, or undertaking is char-
acterized as governmental, proprietary, a core governmental func-
tion, unique to government, undertaken in a dual capacity, essential 
to or not essential to a government or governmental function, or 
could be performed by private enterprise or private persons. 
(b) A "governmental function" may be performed by any depart-
ment, agency, employee, agent, or officer of a governmental entity. 
(5) "Injury" means death, injury to a person, damage to or loss of prop-
erty, or any other injury that a person may suffer to his person, or estate, 
that would be actionable if inflicted by a private person or his agent. 
(6) "Personal injury" means an injury of any kind other than property 
damage. 
(7) "Political subdivision" means any county, city, town, school dis-
trict, public transit district, redevelopment agency, special improvement 
or taxing district, or other governmental subdivision or public corpora-
tion. 
(8) "Property damage" means injury to, or loss of, any right, title, es-
tate, or interest in real or personal property. 
(9) "State" means the state of Utah, and includes any office, depart-
ment, agency, authority, commission, board, institution, hospital, college, 
university, or other instrumentality of the state. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 2; 1973, ch. 
103, § 2; 1978, ch. 27, § 1; 1981, ch. 116, § 1; 
1983, ch. 129, § 2; 1987, ch. 75, § 2; 1987 (1st 
S.S.), ch. 4, § 1; 1988, ch. 2, § 338. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend-
ment alphabetized the definitions of this sec-
tion and renumbered the subsections accord-
ingly, added present Subsection (4), and made 
minor changes in phraseology and punctua-
tion. 
63-30-3. Immunity of governmental entities from suit.—Except as may 
be otherwise provided in this act, all governmental entities shall be immune 
from suit for any injury which may result from the activities of said en-
tities wherein said entity is engaged in the exercise and discharge of a 
governmental function. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 3. 
(Original — 1965) 
63-30-3. Immunity of governmental entities from suit. 
Except as may be otherwise provided in this act, all governmental enti-
ties [-skall-be^ are immune form suit for any injury which (mey-re9u&4offn 
v i l C tl"CTVTLlvJiJ \TT o l l l v l Ull\Tt\>T\Zi3 TTlIljrVIIX TJU1U VIlUIL^r- tt3 ^riTgllgVJUl rrt TTirc T7Vr«crx iw 
^ndniiseharge-ef-^-^vemmentel-^t^ results from the exercise of a 
governmental function, governmentally-owned hospital, nursing home, or 
other governmental health care facility. 
(1978 amendment) 
63-30-3. Immunity of governmental entities from suit. 
Except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter, all governmental 
entities are immune from suit for any injury which results from the exercise 
of a governmental function, governmentally-owned hospital, nursing home, or 
other governmental health care facility, and from an approved medical, nurs-
ing, or other professional health care clinical training program conducted in 
either public or private facilities. 
The management of flood waters and other natural disasters and the con-
struction, repair, and operation of flood and storm systems by governmental 
entities are considered to be governmental functions, and governmental enti-
ties and their officers and employees are immune from suit for any injury or 
damage resulting from those activities. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 3; 1978, ch. 27, Amendment Notes. — The 1985 amend-
§ 2; 1981, ch. 116, § 2; 1984, ch. 33, § 1; 1985, ment inserted "and other natural disasters" in 
ch. 93, § 1. the second paragraph. 
(Controlling statute) 
63-30-34- Limit of judgment against governmental entity 
or employee-
(1) Except as provided in Subsection (3), if a judgment for damages for 
personal injury against a governmental entity, or an employee whom a gov-
ernmental entity has a duty to indemnify, exceeds $250,000 for one person in 
any one occurrence, or $500,000 for two or more persons in any one occur-
rence, the court shall reduce the judgment to that amount, regardless of 
whether or not the function giving rise to the injury is characterized as gov-
ernmental. 
(2) Except as provided in Subsection (3), if a judgment for property damage 
against a governmental entity, or an employee whom a governmental entity 
has a duty to indemnify, exceeds $100,000 in any one occurrence, the court 
shall reduce the judgment to that amount, regardless of whether or not the 
function giving rise to the damage is characterized as governmental. 
(3) The damage limits established in this section do not apply to damages 
awarded as compensation when a governmental entity has taken or damaged 
private property without just compensation. 
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CHAPTER 114. 
KINDERGARTENS. 
AN ACT providing for the establishment and maintenance of kindergartens, in all school districts of a population of two 
thousand and upwards. 
Be it enacted by the Legislature of the State of Utah : 
SECTION 1. Kindergartens provided for. All school districts of a 
population of two thousand and upwards, shall hereafter establish 
and maintain, one or more kindergartens, in said school district; 
open to children resident therein, between the ages of four and six 
years. Said kindergartens must be established within four years 
after the pass; ge of this act. 
Sec. 2. How maintained. The cost of maintaining such kinder-
gartens shall come out of the district school fund, )f the respective 
districts. 
Sec. \\. This act shall take effect July 1st, 190)5, 
Approved this 10th day of March, 1903. 
CHAPTER 115. 
STATE MENTAL HOSPITAL. 
AN ACT amending chapter 7, titie 61, Revised Statutes of Utah, 1898, relating tc the government and control of t to 
State Mental Hospital and providing for the care and treatment of the insane. 
Be it enacted by the Legislature of the State of Utah ; 
SECTION 1. Tha t chapter .7, title .til, Revised Sta tu tes of Utah, 
1898, be and the same is hereby amended to read as follows: 
Sec. 2153. Location. Until otherwise provided, the State Insane 
Asylum now established and located at Provo City, in the county of 
Utah, shall be hereafter known as the State Mental Hospital. 
Sec. 2154. Objects. The objects of the hospital shall be to care 
for all insane persons residing within the State, and to furnish to 
them proper at tendance, medical treatment, seclusion, rest , restraint , 
entertainment, occupation and support tending to restore the mental 
and physical health of such persons or to alleviate their sufferings. 
Sec. 2155. Board of Insanity. The government and control of 
the State Mental Hospital shall be vested in a board, to consist of 
the Governor, Sta te Treasurer and State Auditor, which shall be 
known as the Board of Insanity. 
Sec. 2156. Id. Traveling expenses. Each member of the board 
shall be allowed his t raveling expenses in at tending the meetings of 
the board, payable out of any money in the t reasury of the hospital. 
Sec. 2157. Id, Powers, The board may contract and be con-
THE 
COMPILED LAWS OF UTAH 
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 
A N D 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
AND 
STATUTES OF THE UNITED STATES LOCALLY 
APPLICABLE AND IMPORTANT, 
C03IPILED AND PUBLISHED 
B Y H U T H O R I T Y , 
VOL. I. 
S A L T L A K E C I T Y : 
HERBERT PEMBROKE, BOOK, JOB AND LEGAL BLANK PRINTER, 72 EAST TEMPLE STREET. 
• 
1 8 8 8 . 
A-7 
INSANE ASYLUM. 693 
CHAPTER VIII. 
INSANE ASYLUM. 
SECTION. SECTION. 
1940 .Insane Asylum established: title. 1976 Discharge on showing that pa-
1941 Board of directors; their sue- tient not insane; form of order. 
cessors; Governor a member. 1977 Precedence when not sufficient 
1942 Vacancies, how filled. room. 
1943 Directors to qualify; when to 1978 Provision for indigent not to 
organize. relieve estate of patient. 
1944 Site to be selected. 1979 Infectious and contagious cases 
1945 Plan of buildings; their erection. excluded. 
194(5 Directors to have no interest in 1980 Relatives or friends may pay 
contracts. towards expenses and credit to 
1947 Number of patients provision to be given. 
be made for. 1981 Parties receiving papers are 
1948-1953 Style of board of directors; liable; may appeal. 
their powers and duties. 1982 Officers, etc . , exempt from jury 
1954 Compensation of directors. duty. 
1955 Treasurer and duties; term of 1983 Insane person at large may be 
office. arrested. 
1956 Secretary; duties of. 1984 Persons not to be restrained of 
1957-19(52 Powers and duties of board liberty except according to this 
of directors. act, for insanity. 
1963-1964 Qualifications of medical 1985 Fees of examining physicians. 
superintendent: his duties; his 1986 County to pay costs, etc.; how 
accounts to be audited; semi- reimbursed. 
yearly estimates; supplies, how 1987 When probate judge to make in-
contracted for; record to be quiry. 
kept; annual report. 1988 Provisions for insane excluded 
1965 Assistant physiciau; duties; for want of room. 
compensation: term of office. 1989 Penalty for attempting to intro-
1966-1969 Manner of deciding applica- duce patients contrary to this 
tions for inmates and proceed- act. 
ings. ~" 1990 Penalty for wanton cruelty to 
1970 Charges for inmates, how se- persons restrained as insane. 
cured and paid; moneys found 1991 Penalty for unlawful entry upon 
on inmates may be delivered to asylum premises. 
friends. 1992 Penalty for inducing patient to 
1971 Delivery of patients to asylum. elope. 
1972 When patients able to pay cost 1993 Penalty for bringing pauper in-
of maintenence: how secured: sane, etc., into county to be a 
guardian. charge there. 
1973 Guardian to give bond. 1994 Penalty for other violations of 
1974 Papers to be sent to persons act. 
liable for charges. 1995 Act, when to take effect. 
1975 Kindred of insane person may 
receive him from asylum, bond 
to be given; form. 
§ 1940. s 1. There shall be established upon a site to T e m t o n a l 
be selected by the board of directors hereinafter provided for, Asvium 
and institution for the care and treatment of the insane, to be 
designated and known as the Territorial Insane Asvium. 
A-8 
Senate Debate on the Utah Governmental Immunity Act 
January 18, 1965 
Senator Welch (introducing the bill): 
Now, I'd like to, I'd like to very briefly, uh, explain to you 
the experience that has occurred in our neighboring states. And 
this is one of the reasons why, in my opinion, it is very important 
that we act upon this bill. 
About a year, about two years ago now, the Supreme Court of 
the State of California, by a court order in response to a, a case, 
a specific case brought before that court, just by a court rule and 
court order abolished — completely abolished — governmental 
immunity in that state. Within overnight practically, that state 
was besieged with millions of dollars worth of suits and claims 
against the State of California and its entities. This matter was 
of such great importance to the people of the State of California 
that a, that a special session of the legislature of the State of 
California was called. And that special session passed a 
moratorium on suits against the government of the State of 
California or its entities. And this moratorium was for a year's 
time, until such time as they could make a study and come back with 
recommendations to the legislature. 
They did come back and they did make recommendations and they 
did pass a bill. They passed a series of bills, a very complex 
series of bills. We have, we have had the benefit of those bills. 
We have studied them. That those bills in that state, uh, that 
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legislature, set out immunity by statute in the State of California 
and as we go along you'll find out that's exactly what we've done. 
They set up immunity by statute and then out of the immunity the 
State of California, through its legislative process, carved out 
certain areas in which an action might be brought by the citizens 
of that state against the government of the State of California or 
its entities or subdivisions. This is a matter of controlling, to 
a certain extent, rather than leaving the thing wide open. 
I would like to also emphasize that about a year ago in the 
State of Arizona the Supreme Court did exactly the same thing. And 
I could read you that decision if you like, I have it here, but I'm 
not going to bore you with it. But the supreme court in essence 
said this: The rule of governmental immunity is a rule that has 
been set up and adopted by the courts. It is not a statutory 
creature and therefore it can be abolished by the courts and we 
therefore abolish statutory or I mean governmental immunity from 
suit in our state. 
I was on a panel with the assistant director of uh, the 
legislative council of the State of Arizona. This was about two 
months ago over in the State of Wyoming at the Western Conference 
of the Council of State Governments. I was uh, chairman of the 
panel in connection with governmental immunity and I have there, on 
the panel with me, this man from Arizona. We also had a professor 
from the State of California whose is largely responsible for the, 
for the research and work that went into the California act. This 
0 0 0 0 4 2 3 1 
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man from Arizona said immediately upon the, upon the, uh, abolition 
or striking out and, uh, overruling of governmental immunity in 
their state by this court order, that they were beset by Six 
Million Dollars worth of suits. And they are very anxiously 
working and planning to solve the problem such as the way 
California did. And I have provided them with materials which we 
have, which we have uh, been able to develop in this state. 
Now, this isn't all. About six months ago the court of the 
State of Nevada did exactly the same thing. Now I want to merely 
point out to you, what I'm trying to point out to you and trying to 
get over to you is the fact that a court order or a court decision 
which completely waives and does away with the doctrine of 
governmental immunity then throws the doors wide open to all and 
every kind of suit that might be brought. And I'd like to, to 
state that, that our approach to this matter has been to take a 
middle of the road course. To open the door for those people where 
there's obvious uh, serious handicap to the individual who has been 
injured, but not to leave it open, that door wide open so that it 
will be detrimental to the interest of the state and its 
subdivisions. 
Tape No. 2, Lines 8.3 to 14.5. 
* * * 
Now I'd like to, after going through that general, general 
discussion, I'd like to just, just briefly run through some of the 
provisions of this bill and I'll appreciate it if you'll turn to 
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the bill. It's Senate Bill 4, Senate Bill 4 in your file there. 
Now if you'll note the first part of this bill just has to do with 
definitions and I don't think we'll need to spend any time on that. 
Section 2, if you'll read it, reaffirms for this state the doctrine 
of governmental immunity. It does it by statute. We do not have 
governmental immunity by statute in the State of Utah. We have 
governmental immunity only by reason of having the court having 
said so. And therefore the court could waive it if it wanted to. 
So we reaffirm in this statute, in this bill, the doctrine of 
governmental immunity, Section 2. I'm, I'm uh, I think I'm wrong. 
Section 3. Section 3. It says "Except as may be otherwise 
provided in this act, all governmental entities shall be immune 
from suit for any injury which may result from the activity of said 
entity wherein said entity is engaged in the exercise and discharge 
of a governmental function." Now, we reaffirm that and then later 
on we carve out of that immunity various areas. 
Tape 2, Line 24 to 26. 
* * * 
I have uh, uh, about gone through this bill uh, gentlemen. I 
want to assure you that, that in my opinion this is a necessary 
bill. I think that it will not hurt the State of Utah or its 
subdivisions. I think that it will be helpful because I think that 
uh, we have just as much a possibility of the court, the courts 
taking this matter into their hands and determining that there is, 
that there should be a doing away with this doctrine. I'm not 
0 0 0 0 4 2 3 X 
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going to foretell when and how, but it has happened in the 
surrounding states and I think that this, this approach that we 
have seen is the reasonable approach. It is not, it is not opening 
the door all the way, and I've said this about three times and I 
want to emphasize it, it is not opening the door all the way to 
allowing suits of every kind against the state and its entities. 
It opens it part-way. But this part-way opening does protect the 
citizens of our state. 
Tape 3, Line 20 to 22. 
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the court in habitual cruancy cases, clarification of the role of the pro-
bation officer, provision for some publicity in major delinquency cases, 
clarification of the general purpose statement, definitions of neglected 
and dependent child, qualifications of the probation staff, additional judge-
ship for the second district and appointive powers of the senior judge, also, 
designation of the chief probation officer and defining action where adults 
contribute to the delinquency of a juvenile. 
The Committee recommends the Juvenile Court Act as representing an 
effective, efficient, and conscientious effort on the part of well-qualified 
individuals who have worked to prepare a bill in the best interests of the 
State. 
Governmental Immunity 
The 1963 Legislature directed the Council flto study the effects upon 
states, their political subdivisions and municipal corporations of waiver 
of immunity from suit and consenting to be liable for the torts of its 
officers, employees, and agents as outlined in H.J.R. 21 of the 35th 
Legislature.11 (S.J.R. 14, item 2.) The Legislature considered this study 
of such importance that it separately appropriated the sum of $25,000 and 
directed the Council to appoint a committee with at least one-third of the 
membership from the legal profession. The Council appointed a committee of 
twenty-one members, with representation from the Legislature, the cities, 
counties, special taxing districts, school districts and other interests. 
Bills have previously been introduced in the Legislature to Miive 
governmental immunity. In 1961 a bill was passed, then vetoed by the 
Governor and in 1963 a bill was introduced but failed to pass. 
Research activities include field investigations, gathering of data, 
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assimilation of information, formulation of proposals, drafting of legisla-
tion, and the preparation of a final report. Investigations of the claims 
experience of the State and its political subdivisions has been included in 
the Committee study. The extent of insurance coverage by governmental entities, 
the cost of such insurance and claims experience have been part of the study. 
Questionnaires were sent to other states in regard to tort claims and conse-
quential damage claims. The statutes of other states have been reviewed and 
catalogued. The Utah Code has been carefully examined, section by section. 
Case decisions have been studied. Conferences have been held with insurance 
personnel and rating information has been obtained from the National Bureau 
of Casualty Underwriters. Seven working drafts of legislation have been pre-
pared and studied by the staff, by Committee members, and by the Executive 
Committee. 
The Committee considered the important questions of whether governmental 
immunity from suit was important in the State and whether legislation was 
needed. 
Numerous citizens have been injured in their person and property by 
negligent acts of government employees and by the construction of public 
improvements. In many of these cases no recourse against the governmental 
entity has been possible. It was found that the present system works sub-
stantial injustice to citizens. There is a fear, however, among government 
officials, that to open the door to unrestrained claims would be too burden-
some upon governmental funds. 
The Committee concluded that immunity of governmental entities should 
be waived in relation to responsibility for the negligent acts or omissions 
of public employees. The Committee was not unanimous in its opinion regard-
ing responsibility for consequential damage. This latter type of claim is 
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for indirect or consequential damage resulting from the construction of pub-
lic improvements. It is not necessarily the result of any negligence but is 
merely the consequence of a particular government activity. 
The question of payment of claims was a matter of concern to the Committee. 
It was found that there is already a limited waiver of immunity in the State. 
For example, cities and towns can be sued and must respond in relation to de-
fective streets, sidewalks, culverts, and bridges. The State Road Commission 
has discretionary authority to pay individual claims up to $3,000 for injuries 
resulting from the negligence of its employees. The Fish and Game Commission 
must pay for crop damage resulting from wildlife. It was also found that 
837o of the political subdivisions responding to the survey already carry auto-
mobile insurance, and 307* of those carry comprehensive liability insurance. 
On the basis of the best experience available, it appears that vehicle 
insurance premiums and costs will show little increase should immunity be 
waived, but there may be an increase of as much as five to six times in the 
cost of general liability insurance. There would probably be more claims 
filed and some additional administrative costs incurred in handling these 
claims. 
There was unanimous approval by the committee members that governmental 
entities should be legally authorized to purchase liability insurance to pro-
tect both the entity and the employee. 
At the present time claims against the State are reviewed by the Board 
of Examiners and then passed on to the Legislature for its review and approp-
riation or refusal. If a state agency is not otherwise authorized by law to 
pay claims, then the authority of the Board of Examiners must be recognized 
and claims must be channelled through the Board. 
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The Committee has prepared a draft of legislation patterned after that 
adopted in California and in some other states. This legislation reaffirms 
the rule of governmental immunity, thus eliminating any confusion in the law, 
and then carves out specific exceptions where, as a matter of justice, immu-
nity from suit should be waived- No effort is made in the bill to create new 
or unique rules of substantive liability as far as governmental agencies are 
concerned. Where immunity is waived, liability or responsibility would then 
be determined by the courts. 
A second bill has been prepared which is simply an authorization for the 
permissive purchase of liability insurance. This latter bill does not waive 
immunity. It would solve the problem of immunity only insofar as the govern-
mental entity chooses to purchase liability insurance, thereby referring all 
claims to an insurance carrier. 
If the Legislature meets the question of governmental immunity head-on, 
it can consider the comprehensive draft which defines specific exceptions to 
immunity and also provides for insurance coverage. The second draft merely 
permits the purchase of insurance coverage by the governmental entities. 
The Committee recommends legislation to solve the problem of govern-
mental immunity. 
Justice of Peace 
A follow-up to the study made by a State Bar Committee prior to the 
1963 Legislature to determine the advisability of reforming the J. P. system 
was assigned to a committee of the Council. The Committee believes legisla-
tion is needed to accomplish the objectives of the assignment. The J. P. 
system is in need of reform and the Committee is preparing legislation to 
permit the establishment of "community courts." 
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